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Abstract
This paper assesses the impact of public R&D on ﬁrm R&D using patent application data
on the county and ﬁrm level in Germany. We address the endogeneity of public R&D by
employing an instrumental variable estimator that uses lagged institutional funding for
research institutes and universities as excluded instruments. We ﬁnd that one additional
public patent application generates 3.5 ﬁrm patent applications in the median county, but
also that the relationship turns negative for high levels of public R&D. We estimate the
public costs per ﬁrm patent to be between 0.8 and 1.5 million EURO.
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1 Introduction
There is a clear consensus that stimulating R&D is welfare increasing due to positive ex-
ternalities and uncertainty (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959), but the question about the most
eﬃcient way is still open to debate. In principle, there are two ways to do so. First, go-
vernments can stimulate private R&D by increasing the proﬁtability of R&D investment.
This can be achieved by handing out cash payments or providing beneﬁcial tax treatment,
either in the form of super-deductions for R&D expenses or a lower tax rate on the returns
from R&D. Second, governments can fund public R&D, which may stimulate (domestic)
ﬁrm R&D due to local knowledge spillovers which are driven by personal interactions
and workforce mobility. While there is a large body of empirical literature examining the
impact of direct subsidies1, causal empirical evidence on the magnitude of public R&D
spillovers on ﬁrm R&D is limited and mainly focused on universities. Since universities
engage, however, in both R&D as well as degree production, identifying the transmission
channel at work is challenging. Our paper aims to ﬁll this gap in the existing literature
by investigating local knowledge spillovers of public R&D by universities and research
institutes on ﬁrm R&D using ﬁrm and county level data for Germany between 2003 and
2010. To identify the causal eﬀect and to calculate the cost-eﬀectiveness of public R&D
in stimulating ﬁrm innovation, we employ an instrumental variable estimator which ex-
ploits variation in lagged institutional funding for research institutes and universities as
excluded instruments.
We believe that Germany provides an excellent set-up for our research question. First,
Germany relies substantially on public R&D carried out by independent research insti-
tutes. These institutes spend together almost as much on R&D as the higher education
sector in Germany. Figure 1 illustrates the international comparison. While Germany,
Japan, the UK, the US and the average EU 28 country have similar R&D expenditures
relative to GDP in the higher education sector, R&D spending in the government sector
(including the research institutes) is highest in Germany among the selected countries.
Second, the German ﬁrm R&D support strategy mainly consists of funding public R&D.
In particular, Germany does not oﬀer super-deductions for R&D expenditures or a lower
tax rate on returns from R&D investment in the form of a patent box as recently intro-
duced in several European countries (see, for example, Alstadsaeter et al., 2018). Thus,
our focus on Germany mitigates concerns that the estimated spillovers of public R&D
are driven by both, public R&D as well as generous direct subsidiaries. Third, German
ﬁrms have comparably high R&D expenditures. As shown in Figure 1, the share of ﬁrm
1See David et al. (2000) and Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014) for a literature review on the impact of
cash subsidies on ﬁrm R&D and Hall and Van Reenen (2000) and Guceri and Liu (2017) for a literature
review on the impact of R&D tax credits on ﬁrm R&D. In general, it seems to be the case that R&D
tax credits are quite successful in stimulating ﬁrm R&D (e.g. Lokshin and Mohnen, 2012; Mulkay and
Mairesse, 2013; Rao, 2016; Dechezlepretre et al., 2016; Guceri, 2018), while cash subsidies increase ﬁrm
R&D in particular for smaller and younger ﬁrms (e.g. Bronzini and Iachini, 2014; Howell, 2017).
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R&D expenditures in Germany is second largest among the selected countries. Thus, a
no impact result cannot be explained by a general low R&D intensity of German ﬁrms.
Figure 1: Public R&D Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Eurostat 2014.
Our empirical strategy to quantify the local knowledge spillovers of public R&D on
private R&D exploits county-level variation within Germany. This strategy has the beneﬁt
that all ﬁrms operate in the same institutional environment, but it comes at the cost
that we are estimating a lower bound of the eﬀect due to the potential presence of non-
regional spillovers.2 A minor concern for our analysis are, however, negative product-
market related spillovers (due to competition) as identiﬁed by Branstetter and Sakakibara
(2002) or Bloom et al. (2013) since public institutes do not compete for market shares
with private ﬁrms. We focus on variation between counties - which have an approximately
size of 1000 square kilometers in Germany - as this is likely to capture a large part
of local knowledge spillovers given the results of prior literature (e.g. Andersson et al.,
2009; Belenzon and Schankerman, 2013). Due to the lack of precise R&D expenditures
for universities and (all) research institutes, we use patent applications from the OECD
RegPat database as a proxy for public as well as ﬁrm R&D. This database covers all
patents that are ﬁled with the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) and under the Patent
Co-operation Treaty (PCT). It includes information on general patent characteristics as
well as address information for inventors and applicants. We use the home address of
inventors for the geographical mapping of patents as it allows a better approximation of
where R&D takes place than using the location of the applicant. The latter would be
in particular misleading for large ﬁrms that consist of several establishments or legally
non-independent research institutes as for example the Fraunhofer institutes, for which
2This assumes positive non-regional spillovers. In principle, non-regional spillovers could also be
negative, if R&D activities are relocated. While we ﬁnd some evidence for the latter, the eﬀect is small.
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the applicant is always the Fraunhofer Society. To address concerns about the use of
patent data as a proxy for R&D activities (e.g. Griliches, 1998), we also use the number
of ﬁrm R&D employees on the county level as a dependent variable in a robustness test.
Further, we account for patent quality following the procedure outlined in Ernst et al.
(2014) in another robustness check.
Although we are able to estimate the relationship of interest on the county as well
as the ﬁrm level and are able to control for a wide range of county characteristics, a
remaining concern regarding our empirical strategy is the potential endogeneity of public
R&D. The level as well as the quality of public R&D may be inﬂuenced by private R&D.
We address this concern by implementing an instrumental variable estimator (IV) using
two excluded instruments. Our ﬁrst excluded instrument is the 4-year-lagged institutional
funding for Fraunhofer and Leibniz institutes. Using the 4-year lagged funding addresses
the concern that private as well as public patent applications are driven by unobserved
factors. Further, the use of solely institutional funding rules out that privately funded
public R&D is driving the results. To address the persistence in public and private R&D,
which could invalidate our instrument, we also solely exploit time-series variation in the
instrument. Our second excluded instrument is institutional funding for central service
staﬀ of universities as librarians and administrators. This correlates with the generosity
of funding for universities and thus the research undertaken, but avoids the direct link to
the number of students which inﬂuence the local human capital stock and thus ﬁrm R&D
as well. While we are convinced that the instruments are exogenous, we are also able
to test this explicitly since we have identiﬁed two potential instruments. An additional
beneﬁt of our IV strategy is that it accounts also for a potential measurement error
in the number (as well as the quality) of public patent applications and dynamic mis-
speciﬁcation. Moreover, our focus on patent applications and institutional funding allows
us to calculate the cost-eﬀectiveness (institutional funding per ﬁrm patent) of this ﬁrm
R&D support strategy and hence a comparison with other strategies, as for example R&D
tax credits.
We obtain ﬁve main results from our empirical analysis. First, using our IV strategy
we ﬁnd a semi-elasticity of 0.09 for ﬁrm patents with respect to public patents in the
median county with non-zero public patents. Thus, an increase in the number of public
patent applications by one increases the number of ﬁrm patent applications by 9%, or by
3.5 patent applications (using the median number of ﬁrm patent applications in counties
with non-zero public patents). The results are unchanged when including county-ﬁxed
eﬀects and ﬂexible state-trends or when estimating on the applicant-region level (including
applicant-region-ﬁxed eﬀects). Further, the results are robust to our instrument choice.
When using the number of ﬁrm R&D employees as a proxy for ﬁrms' R&D activities, we
obtain a somewhat larger semi-elasticity. This is consistent with the argument that not
all innovations are patentable. Accounting for patent quality leaves the results, however,
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mainly unchanged. Comparing IV to OLS estimates suggests that endogeneity is of minor
importance as the point estimates are very similar when estimating without county-ﬁxed
eﬀects. The OLS estimate is, however, strongly downward biased due to measurement
error or dynamic mis-speciﬁcation or both once we include county or application-region
ﬁxed eﬀects.
We estimate the marginal costs of one additional public patent application to be
between 2.7 and 5.3 million EURO. Hence, marginal institutional costs per ﬁrm patent
application are between 0.8 and 1.5 million EURO in the median county with non-zero
public patents. This is only half as large as the implied public costs for one ﬁrm patent
application in the US or the UK using R&D tax credits as ﬁrm R&D support strategy
based on the results by Dechezlepretre et al. (2016) and Rao (2016). Our estimated costs
might even be lower as they ignore that an additional public patent has been generated
and that positive non-regional spillovers might exist.
Second, we ﬁnd evidence that the estimated semi-elasticity of ﬁrm R&D with respect
to public R&D is non-monotone. The positive eﬀect decreases with the level of public
patents within a county and turns negative at a level of 21 public patents. This is,
however, a relatively high level of public R&D as it suggests that the marginal eﬀect is
positive in 95% of the counties in Germany.
Our third main result is that public R&D aﬀects in particular the number of patenting
ﬁrms, but less the patent intensity of a ﬁrm (number of patents per ﬁrm). This contrasts
with evidence on the impact of R&D tax credits on ﬁrm R&D as shown, for example, in
Dechezlepretre et al. (2016). By using applicant level estimations, we further show that
the extensive margin is not driven by previously non-patenting ﬁrms but occasionally
patenting ﬁrms.
Our fourth result sheds some light on the existence of non-local spillovers due to within
ﬁrm spillovers. Thus, we assess whether a ﬁrm that is active in two regions spends more
in both regions or less in one and more in the other, if the number of public patents
increases in the latter region. Our results suggests negative within ﬁrm spillovers, but the
eﬀect is quantitatively small.
Finally, we show that the transmission channel at work is indeed personal interactions
and potentially workforce mobility as we ﬁnd that ﬁrms that have jointly ﬁled patents with
universities or research institutes in a region in the past beneﬁt the most from public R&D
in this region. This is consistent with other results presented in this paper, e.g. (i) it is
not public-private collaboration per se that drive the results, (ii) the impact of ﬁrm R&D
does not occur through spin-oﬀs as we show that ﬁrms with patent applications before our
sample period react stronger and (iii) proximity does matter as ﬁrms do relocate R&D
activities into regions with more public R&D.
Our work contributes to the literature on the relationship between public and private
R&D in several ways. First, we provide evidence in line with several other studies on
4
positive local knowledge spillovers of public R&D. The seminal paper in this ﬁeld is Jaﬀe
(1989). Using US state level data, Jaﬀe (1989) ﬁnds an elasticity of corporate patents to
university R&D expenditure of around 0.1. Several studies have found similar empirical
evidence for local knowledge spillovers. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Jaﬀe et al.
(1993) ﬁnd that spatial proximity matters for the diﬀusion of (private) knowledge. Be-
lenzon and Schankerman (2013) conﬁrm these results for university patents. In addition,
Andersson et al. (2009) ﬁnd that openings of higher education institutions in Sweden
increased the number of patents in the same region.
While most of the recent studies have been able to use less aggregated data than Jaﬀe
(1989), not all of them have been able to address the potential endogeneity of public R&D.
The most convincing approach in the literature used to tackle the endogeneity of public
research carried out by universities is by Kantor and Whalley (2014). They exploit the fact
that US universities usually invest a ﬁxed amount of their endowments' market value every
year. Based on the argument that past university endowments are independent of the
county's future economic performance, they use past university endowment in combination
with variation in stock market returns as an instrument for university spending. They ﬁnd
a substantial downward bias in the OLS estimate using 3-year changes in labor income
in the non-educational sector as the dependent variable. Our identiﬁcation strategy is
similar in a vein that variation in (lagged) institutional funding can also be seen as an
endowment shock for research institutes and universities. Further, our results reveal an
even larger downward bias.
Second, we bring the somewhat contrasting results in the literature on the impact of
public on private R&D closer together. While all of the above mentioned studies ﬁnd
unambiguously positive eﬀects, there are also a non-negligible number of papers ﬁnding
negative eﬀects of public R&D and thus a crowding out of private R&D (see David
et al. (2000) for a literature review up to 2000 and Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014) for a
more recent one). So far, three main channels have been suggested in the literature that
may explain this result. First, the supply of R&D workers may be inelastic, which means
more public R&D increases ﬁrms' R&D costs.3 Second, public R&D might directly replace
private R&D, if ﬁrms substitute public R&D for their own R&D. Third, public R&D could
distort competition between ﬁrms by funding some ﬁrms at the cost of others. Although
our paper cannot answer which of the three forces is the dominant one in the German
context, we show that public R&D may have a positive or a negative impact on private
R&D in Germany and that the sign of the eﬀects depends on the level of public R&D
3A similar argument has been raised with respect to the impact of public subsidies on private R&D
spending. While earlier literature found positive eﬀects, Goolsbee (1998) and David and Hall (2000) sug-
gest that public R&D funding does not increase real private R&D spending, but solely raises researchers'
wages. While there is evidence for this wage inﬂation eﬀect (Aerts, 2008; Lokshin and Mohnen, 2013;
Wolﬀ and Reinthaler, 2008), recent literature conﬁrms the existence of an additional positive eﬀect on real
R&D expenditures (Aerts, 2008; Görg and Strobl, 2007; Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie,
2003; Thomson and Jensen, 2013; Wolﬀ and Reinthaler, 2008).
5
carried out in a region.
Our third contribution to the literature is that we provide robust evidence that it is
indeed public R&D production that aﬀects private R&D. One challenge regarding prior
work is the identiﬁcation of the driving force at work, as most of the studies focus on public
R&D carried out by universities. Universities engage, however, in both degree as well as
R&D production and both are likely to inﬂuence R&D activities by ﬁrms. Disentangling
these two eﬀects is challenging, as it necessarily relies on a parametrization. Abel and
Deitz (2011) proxy the degree production dimension with the number of degrees per
100 working-age people and the research dimension by R&D expenditures per enrolled
student. They ﬁnd that it is in particular a university's research dimension that increases
local human capital while the impact of the degree production dimension is limited due
to labor force mobility. Some of the results by Kantor and Whalley (2014) can be read in
a similar vein. They ﬁnd that the eﬀect is larger in counties with universities that have
a higher research intensity and in counties with industries that cite university patents
more often. However, while this seems conclusive, there are also other dimensions of
universities as the quality of degrees, which is related to both, the research as well as
the degree production of universities. We contribute to this stream of literature and the
ongoing debate by applying an IV strategy that exploits variation in institutional funding
of research institutes, which is undoubtedly unrelated to degree production.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. In section 2 we explain the German
research system. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology employed. The
empirical results are presented and discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
2 R&D in the Public Sector in Germany
Since the drawing of the Lisbon strategy in 2000, the EU member countries aim to invest
3% of GDP in R&D. Compared to other EU countries Germany is close to this target
with a sum of public and private R&D expenditures of 2.88% of GDP (based on 2014
data). Surprising is that Germany is also one of the few EU countries that oﬀers only cash
subsidies to the private sector and does not grant tax credits for R&D expenses or a lower
tax rate on the return of R&D investment in the form of a patent box. Instead the German
federal and the state governments heavily invest in public R&D carried out by independent
research institutes and - similar to other countries - fund universities, which also engage
in R&D activities. The majority of the independent research institutes belong to one of
the following umbrella associations: the Max Planck Society, the Fraunhofer Society, the
Leibniz Society and the Helmholtz Community.4 As shown in Figure 1, R&D spending in
the government sector (including the independent research institutes) is almost as high
4Governmental research institutes exist in Germany as well, but they are of minor importance and
conduct mainly departmental research for federal and state administration.
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(12.5 billion EURO in 2014) as in the higher education sector (15.3 billion EURO).
Figure 2: Evolution of Public Patent Applications by Type of Applicant
Notes: Patent applications include only applications ﬁled with the European Patent Oﬃce or under the Patent
Co-operation Treaty. Source: Authors' calculation based on OECD RegPAT database 2000-2012.
The structure of the higher education sector in Germany is as follows. Overall, there
are more than 400 higher education institutes but only about 25% of them are real uni-
versities (see also Table 1). The rest are universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen),
which engage in research as well but to a much smaller extent, as they are usually highly
specialized in one ﬁeld. While the number of universities of applied sciences has increased
over time, the number of universities has been stable. The state, in which the higher
education institute is located, is responsible for 75% of the basic funding, which is usually
a function of the number of students, the number of graduates and the amount of third
party funding obtained. These criteria vary from state to state. The federal government
and the private sector contribute in the form of public and private third party funding for
speciﬁc research projects. Tuition fees are not a signiﬁcant source of funding. The level of
university R&D expenditures has increased in our sample period, from 8.4 billion EURO
in 2000 to 12.7 billion EURO in 2010.5 The main driver was an increase in third-party
funding, which grew from 2.8 billion EURO (one fourth) in 2002 to 5.9 billion EURO (one
half) in 2010. The number of university patent applications ﬁled with the EPO or under
the PCT also increased between 2000 to 2010 (see Figure 2).6
5German Federal Ministry of Finance, Data portal, Table 1.6.2 (http://www.datenportal.bmbf.de/
portal/de/K16.html, last accessed 02/08/2018).
6One factor which is likely to have contributed to the increase in university patent applications is a law
change in 2002. Up to 2002, researchers who worked at a university were able to ﬁle patents as the sole
applicant. After the reform, universities were mandated to register as the applicant and the researcher
was only named as the inventor and compensated for his invention by the university.
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The main players in the government sector are the research institutes that belong to
one of the four research umbrella organizations named earlier. They account for roughly
75% of overall R&D expenditures in the government sector in Germany.7 A large share
of their income (60%) comes from the federal and the state governments in the form of
institutional funding. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity between organizations.
Further, the reader should note that the federal structure in Germany is also visible in
public R&D funding as the state in which the institute is located does not bear the whole
(state) burden, but all other states contribute to the funding as well.8
Table 1: Funding and Spending of Public R&D in 2010
Higher Fraunhofer Max Helmholtz Leibniz Other
Education Planck
# Institutions 415 60 75 17 86 ./.
(106 Uni.)
Share fundamental research ./. 5 100 71 75 30
Share natural sciences 30 30 83 52 57 27
Share engineering 20 64 0 34 10 22
Share humanities 22 2 11 1 20 31
# Overall patents ./. 502 87 approx. 400 approx. 120 ./.
# EPO and PCT patents 780 421 81 283 120 ./.
R&D budget (ebn) 12.7 1.62 1.54 3.20 1.41 5.2
Institutional funding (ebn) 6.8 0.55 1.23 2.04 0.91 ./.
Own business income (ebn) ./. 0.5 0.07 0.6 0.01 ./.
Institutional funding shares
Federal gov. 25 90 50 90 50 ./.
Home state gov. 75 6.7 25 5 25-50 ./.
Other state gov. 0 3.3 25 5 25-50 ./.
Notes: Federal and state funding shares are on average. Contribution of other states depends on Koenigsteiner Schluessel.
Patent applications include only applications ﬁled with the European Patent Oﬃce or under the Patent Co-operation Treaty.
Humanities include social sciences.
Source: Authors' calculations based on German Federal Ministry of Finance, data portal, Table 1.6.1 and 1.2.2, German
Statistical Oﬃce, 2012, Finance and Taxes (Fachserie 14), Reihe 3.6, Table 2.4, 3.8, 4, GWK - Pakt fuer Forschung und
Innovation - Monitoring-Bericht 2018, Table 14, and OECD RegPat database, 2010.
The Fraunhofer Society (17,000 employees) consists of 60 legally non-independent
institutes (in 2010) and is the largest organization for application-oriented research in
Europe. Two third of their R&D expenditures comes from project funding or own income
which is relatively high compared to the other research organizations, the remainder is
institutional funding. The latter comes to 90% from the federal government, 3.3% from
the home state and 6.6% from all other states. In 2010, the overall budget of the
Fraunhofer Society amounted to 1.62 billion EURO and the Fraunhofer institutes ﬁled
421 patent applications with the EPO (or under PCT) in out data, out of 502 patentable
7German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2012, Finance and Taxation (Fachserie 14), Reihe 3.6, Table 1.3.
8The contribution of all non-home states follows the Koenigsteiner Schluessel, which is based on tax
revenue after ﬁscal equalization (67%) and population size of the respective state (33%).
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innovations in total in 2010.9
Researchers at the 75 Max Planck institutes (13,000 employees) conduct solely funda-
mental research. The majority of the organization's expenditures (1.54 billion EURO in
2010) is institutionally funded (around 80%) and stems equally from the federal govern-
ment and the states. Half of the state share is funded by the home state and the rest
by all other states. The Max Planck society registered 81 new patents with the EPO (or
under the PCT) in our data and had in total 87 patent applications in 2010.10 The rela-
tively high expenditures per ﬁled patent compared to the Fraunhofer institutes is due to
a stronger focus on natural sciences (83% compared to 30%), humanities (11% compared
to 2%) and fundamental research (100% compared to 5%).
The Helmholtz Community (32,000 employees) is the biggest research organization in
Germany and consists of 17 research centers. They conduct fundamental research (71%)
by employing large facilities. Institutional funding makes up around 75% of their total
income (3.20 billion EURO in 2010) and public and private third party funding and own
income around 25%. The institutional share is borne to 90% by the federal government,
5% by the home state and the rest by all other states. The Helmholtz institutes ﬁled
around 400 new patent applications in 2010.11 We observe, however, only 70% of them
in our data. This is slightly less than the share for the other associations and likely to
be related to patents ﬁled by subsidiaries of the institutes (which we do not consider)
and patent applications ﬁled by foreign institutes. While the ratio of expenditures per
patent is closer to the one for the Fraunhofer institutes compared to the Max Planck
institutes, it is still larger. The reasons is the stronger focus on natural sciences (52%)
and fundamental research (71%).
The Leibniz Society (13,500 employees) has 86 independent member institutions that
widely vary from academic service facilities to fundamental research institutes. Around
65% of their budget (1.41 billion EURO in 2010) is institutionally funded. Half of the
institutional funding comes from the federal government, and on average 25% from the
home and 25% from all other states, but this varies between institutes. The member
institutions of the Leibniz society ﬁled 120 patent applications in our data, out of around
120 in total in 2010.12 The relatively higher expenditures per ﬁled patent result from
9GWK - Pakt fuer Forschung und Innovation - Monitoring-Bericht 2018, Table 14 (https://www.
gwk-bonn.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Dokumente/Papers/GWK-Heft-58-Monitoring-Bericht-2018.
pdf, last accessed 02/08/2018).
10GWK - Pakt fuer Forschung und Innovation - Monitoring-Bericht 2018, Table 14 (https://www.
gwk-bonn.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Dokumente/Papers/GWK-Heft-58-Monitoring-Bericht-2018.
pdf, last accessed 02/08/2018).
11No exact number is available for 2010. In 2012, 409 patents have been ﬁled. (GWK - Pakt
fuer Forschung und Innovation - Monitoring-Bericht 2018, Table 14 (https://www.gwk-bonn.de/
fileadmin/Redaktion/Dokumente/Papers/GWK-Heft-58-Monitoring-Bericht-2018.pdf, last acces-
sed 02/08/2018).)
12No exact number is available for 2010. In 2012, 121 patents have been ﬁled (GWK - Pakt
fuer Forschung und Innovation - Monitoring-Bericht 2018, Table 14 (https://www.gwk-bonn.de/
fileadmin/Redaktion/Dokumente/Papers/GWK-Heft-58-Monitoring-Bericht-2018.pdf, last acces-
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a larger budget share for natural science (55%), humanities (20%) and for fundamental
research (75%).
The funding for the research institutes is set for some years in advance in non-public
committees, in which representatives of the umbrella organizations as well as of the fe-
deral and state governments take part. Institutional funding as well as overall funding
increased over time, the latter from 5.4 billion EURO in 2002 to 7.8 billion EURO in
2010. Consistent with the budget increase, the number of patent applications by these re-
search institutes observed in our data has - except for the Helmholtz institutes - increased
between 2000 and 2010 (see Figure 2).
Figure 3 summarizes the evolution of the overall number of patent applications by
universities and our considered research institutes. Further, the ﬁgure shows the evolution
of private patents, which also increased between 2000 and 2010.
Figure 3: Evolution of Public and Firm Patent Applications
Notes: Patent applications include only applications ﬁled with the European Patent Oﬃce or under the Patent
Co-operation Treaty. Public patent applications include only applications ﬁled by universities and the considered research
institutes. Source: Authors' calculation based on OECD RegPAT database, 2000-2012.
3 Data and Empirical Methodology
3.1 General Estimation Strategy
Our empirical strategy assesses the impact of patent applications by universities and
research institutes as a proxy for public R&D on patent applications by ﬁrms on the
sed 02/08/2018).)
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German county level between 2003 and 2010.13 Our estimation equation reads as follows:
ln(CPi,t) = αi + β1PPi,t + β2PP
2
i,t + γX + i,t (1)
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of patent applications ﬁled
by ﬁrms located in county i at time t. Since 99% of the county-year observations in the
sample have non-zero ﬁrm patent applications, using the log-linear model is not restrictive
compared to using a count-model. We prefer the log-linear model as it seems to be more
robust. However, we report also the results of a Poisson model with the number of ﬁrm
patent applications as dependent variable to convince the reader that the model choice is
not driving the results.
Our main explanatory variable of interest is the number of public patent applications
(PP) in county i at time t. To allow a ﬂexible relationship, we include the number of
public patents linear and squared.14 An important assumption of our estimation strategy
is that only ﬁrms active in region i beneﬁt from public patents in region i. Hence, we
are estimating a lower bound of the impact of public patents on ﬁrm patents, if positive
non-local knowledge spillovers exist. Their magnitude is, however, likely to be small given
that we estimate on the county level and the results of prior literature (e.g. Andersson
et al., 2009; Belenzon and Schankerman, 2013). To rule out that we are overestimating
the spillover eﬀects due to a potential relocation of ﬁrm R&D activities into regions with
high levels of public R&D within Germany, we investigate this channel explicitly in a
robustness check.
Our two main variables are constructed using the OECD RegPat database. This
database covers all patent applications ﬁled with the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) and
under the Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT) up to 2014.15 The database includes general
information about the patent as well as name, address and county codes of applicants and
inventors. The address information for the inventors are particularly important for our
analysis, as we use them to map patent applications to counties.16 We believe this to be
superior to using the applicants' address information, as the applicants' location may be
very diﬀerent from the location of the invention. This is particular true for large ﬁrms
13While it is certainly of interest to investigate patent class heterogeneity, we are not able to do so in
a credible way due to a lack of instruments.
14In a non-reported robustness test, we also include the number of public patents to the power of three.
The estimated semi-elasticities are very similar. The main diﬀerence is that the semi-elasticity is larger
for low levels of public patent applications and decreases stronger with the level of public patents. Results
are available upon request. Including higher order polynomials is not possible, as the instrument strength
is then not longer suﬃcient.
15A patent application ﬁled under the PCT is similar to a patent application ﬁled with the EPO. It
allows to ﬁle one patent application to protect an invention in several (potentially all PCT contracting)
states.
16This is also the reason why we cannot use PATSTAT. While for some countries PATSTAT includes
also address information for inventors, it does not so for Germany.
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that have several establishments and legally non-independent research institutes as, for
example, the Frauhofer institutes. Given that we are estimating on the county level, we
believe that most researchers live and work in the same county.17
One potential disadvantage of our data is that it does not include all patents ﬁled
by ﬁrms, universities and research institutes. The resulting bias is, however, likely to
be small. First, according to the German Patent Oﬃce, roughly 660.000 patents were
valid in Germany in 2017, 80% of them were granted by the EPO.18 We observe a similar
ratio of EPO and PCT patent applications to overall patents for the research institutes
as shown in Table 1. Second, Dechezlepretre et al. (2016) study the impact of R&D tax
credits on national and EPO patent applications by UK ﬁrms. They show that the EPO
patents are of higher value but also that the relative impact of the UK R&D tax credit
on the number of ﬁrms' national and EPO patent applications is of similar magnitude.
We identify patent applications by ﬁrms using the legal form of the applicant and
public patents via the applicants' names in the database. To obtain a reasonable proxy
for R&D activities, we adjust the raw number of patent applications as follows: First, we
count patents only once independent of the number of patent classes they are ﬁled. Second,
we weight for the same reason patents by the number of inventors and applicants.19 Thus,
if a patent is ﬁled by one applicant and invented by two researchers, one located in county
A and the other in county B, county A and B get 0.5 patents. In the case of two applicants,
one is a ﬁrm and the other an individual, county A and B would have 0.25 patents each.
The remaining parts in our estimation equation are a county speciﬁc eﬀect (αi) and
our set of control variables, captured in the matrix X.20 The latter includes the population
in the county, linear and squared, the population density, linear and squared, the number
of physicians per 100.000 inhabitants as well as the number of students per 1.000 inhabi-
tants.21 To account for the tax burden on ﬁrm proﬁts, which aﬀects innovation behavior
as well, we include the business rate multiplier as well as the property tax multiplier. In
addition, we include the seat share of the Social Democrat Party, the Greens, the Liberals,
and the Christian Democrats in the community councils. Moreover, we account for the
fact that during our sample period, several neighboring countries of Germany have intro-
duced patent boxes. These patent boxes oﬀer a substantially lower tax rate on proﬁts
from patents and thus might aﬀect innovation behavior in particular in German coun-
17To the extent that this is not the case, it will introduce measurement error, which is, however,
addressed by our IV strategy outlined later.
18Press notice of the German Patent Oﬃce (https://www.dpma.de/dpma/veroeffentlichungen/
statistiken/patente/index.html, last accessed 02/08/2018).
19In a sensitivity check we only weight by the number of inventors, the results are basically unchanged.
This is not surprising since the majority of patents are ﬁled by only one applicant.
20The control variables are obtained from the INKAR database as well as from Statistik Lokal, provided
by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce. The tax rates as well as the political variable stem from the municipality
level, we use them thus municipality-population weighted.
21In a robustness check, we also included the natural logarithm of the population, linear and squared,
and the results are unchanged.
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ties that are located close to those countries. Belgium and the Netherlands introduced
a patent box in 2006 and Luxembourg in 2007. We deﬁne two dummy variables, one if
the county belongs to the 25% closest counties to Belgium and the other if the county
belongs to the 25% closest counties to the Netherlands or Luxembourg. The indicator
variables are interacted with the respective reform dummy. Finally, we absorb business
cycle eﬀects as well as diﬀerences between states by including year and state ﬁxed eﬀects
and in robustness test also linear and squared state trends.
Our estimation sample covers the years from 2003 to 2010 due to the availability of
the data for our instruments, which are described below. From the overall 412 counties in
Germany, we exclude the city states, which make up 4 counties in total (Berlin, Bremen,
Bremerhaven and Hamburg), due to their larger size and 8 additional outlier counties.
The latter are characterized by having a number of ﬁrm patents in the top 1% of the
distribution. We remove them to rule out that a handful of large ﬁrms or large cities are
driving the results. This leaves us with 3,208 county-year observations. In the log-linear
model, only 3,188 county-year observations are used as 20 county-year observations have
zero ﬁrm patent applications.
In additional speciﬁcations, we also estimate the relationship of interest on the applicant-
region level while accounting for applicant region ﬁxed eﬀects. This allows us to explore
heterogeneity between ﬁrms (applicants) with respect to their patenting behavior in the
past. In addition, we investigate not only the overall response of ﬁrm R&D, but also the
importance of the intensive margin, e.g. the number of patents per ﬁrm, and the extensive
margin, e.g. the number of patenting ﬁrms. Finally, as mentioned above, we assess the
role of within ﬁrm spillovers as one potential form of non-regional spillovers that could
lead to an upward bias in our estimates. To do so, we include the number of public patent
applications in all other regions, linear and squared, in which the applicant ﬁled patents
between 1999 and 2002.
3.2 Instrumental Variable Strategy
There are three main concerns regarding our outlined estimation strategy. These are
(i) omitted variables that drive both private and public R&D, (ii) reverse causality, since
public R&D may be inﬂuenced by private R&D, and (iii) the assumed immediate impact of
public R&D on private R&D. The latter point is less severe when using cross-sectional and
time-series variation, but highly restrictive when exploiting solely time-series variation.
We address these three challenges by employing an IV estimator using two sets of excluded
instruments.
Our ﬁrst instrument is the 4-year lagged institutional funding for Fraunhofer and
Leibniz institutes that engage in R&D activities.22 We use solely institutional funding
22The data for Leibniz institutes have been obtained from annual publications of the Leibniz Society.
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instead of overall R&D expenditures to rule out a direct correlation of ﬁrm R&D with
public R&D since the research institutes, in particular the Fraunhofer institutes, do carry
out R&D on behalf of ﬁrms. Further, we exclude public project funding, as the likelihood
of receiving it depends strongly on the success probability of a particular project. Since
institutional funding may still correlate with ﬁrm R&D if governments take the level
of ﬁrm R&D in a region into account when deciding about the level of institutional
funding23 or if both private and public R&D activities are driven by unobserved factors,
we use lagged institutional funding. Our choice of the 4-year lagged institutional funding
is motivated by ensuring a suﬃciently long period to address a potential reverse causality
or omitted variable bias on the one hand and by ensuring a suﬃciently strong instrument
on the other hand.24 Since the use of lagged funding to address reverse causality fails
if public and private R&D activities are highly persistent and cross-section variation is
used for identiﬁcation, we also solely exploit time-series variation by including county-
ﬁxed eﬀects. To avoid that in this case a substantial part of the variation in the excluded
instrument stems from institute openings or closures, which are likely to be even more
endogenous, we consider only institutional funding for institutes that existed between
1999 and 2007 when constructing the instrument.
Our second instrument focuses on R&D expenditures in the higher education sector.
More precisely, we use the 4-year lagged institutional funding for central service staﬀ of
universities that existed between 1999 and 2007.25 The arguments for using lagged in-
stitutional funding and for focusing on higher education institutes that existed between
1999 and 2007 are the same as for the research institutes. Further, we focus solely on
universities which are the main driver of R&D in the higher education sector in Germany.
Since lagged institutional funding of universities is a function of the number of students
and thus of the number of graduates in 3 to 5 years time, we consider only institutional
funding for central service staﬀ as administrators or librarians. This is substantially less
correlated with the number of students, but still an indicator of the research activities
The data for Fraunhofer institutes has been provided by the Fraunhofer Society. We also collected
information for Helmholtz institutes and have been provided with data for Max Planck institutes by
the Max Planck Society. For Max Planck institutes the data only starts in 2005 and for the Helmholtz
institutes the data is less precise as Helmholtz institutes usually consist of several establishments and we
were only able to collect institutional funding data on the institute level.
23For Fraunhofer institutes there is even a mechanical relationship, as their institutional funding de-
pends explicitly on the level of third party funding.
24In a robustness check, we also use the 6 and 8-years lagged institutional funding. Results are very
similar and available upon request.
25The data for the construction of the variable stems from the Employee-Statistic of the higher educa-
tion sector in Germany, which is provided by the research data center of the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of
the State and the Laender and can be assessed via remote access. The data includes information on all
employees in the higher education sector, in particular their job description (professor, research assistant,
administrator, etc.), the department they work for, the number of hours worked and the funding of the
position (institutional, private or public third party). Since the data does not include information on sa-
laries, we assume a yearly wage of 30.000 EURO per full-time employee when calculating the institutional
funding for central service staﬀ.
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carried out by a university, as it correlates with the generosity of the institutional fun-
ding. In addition, more staﬀ for central services reduces the administrative burden for
researchers.
One remaining concern regarding our instruments is a potential correlation with direct
subsidies given to ﬁrms. If the amount of ﬁrm R&D subsidies correlates with the institu-
tional funding, the eﬀect we are estimating may be driven by the subsidies or the funding
of public R&D. Due to a lack of data for the regional distribution of ﬁrm R&D subsidies,
we are not able to rule this out directly. However, there are at least two arguments why a
co-founding is unlikely. First, the amount of direct subsidies is relatively small compared
to public funding for research institutes and the higher education institutions. While
the federal and the state governments fund 19 billion EURO R&D expenditures in the
government and higher education sector, they fund only 2 billion EURO R&D expendi-
tures in the business sector (out of 47 billion EURO).26 Second, although we do observe
a positive correlation of the growth rate of overall direct subsidies and the growth rate of
overall public funding for research institutes (0.76, p-value: 0.03) and universities (0.42,
p-value: 0.30), the correlation turns negative and insigniﬁcant for research institutes (-
0.09, p-value: 0.82) and universities (-0.29, p-value: 0.48) once we use the 4-year lagged
growth rate. Thus our estimates would only be biased if direct subsidies also need 4 years
to stimulate patent applications by ﬁrms. This seems, however, rather unlikely.
We implement the IV strategy in the linear model as a two stage least square (2SLS)
estimation and in the Poisson model via a control function approach. While the 2SLS
model uses the predicted values for the endogenous explanatory variables based on control
variables and excluded instruments (the ﬁrst stage) to remove the endogeneity, the control
function approach corrects for the endogeneity by including the predicted residuals of the
same ﬁrst stage regression as regressor. We report robust standard errors for the log-linear
model and (county-block) bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) for the Poisson
model. To mitigate level diﬀerences in the amount of institutional funding, we use the
logarithm of institutional funding plus one, linear and squared, as excluded instruments.
Both instruments are highly relevant when estimating without county-ﬁxed eﬀects (see
col. (1) and (2) in Table A.1 in the Appendix). If we include county-ﬁxed eﬀects, only
the impact of institutional funding for research institutes remains statistically signiﬁcant
(see col. (3) and (4)).
3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Graphical Analysis
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis are shown in Table
2. The average number of patents per county is 54 and the number of ﬁrm patents 47.
26German Federal Ministry of Finance, Data portal, Table 1.1.1 (http://www.datenportal.bmbf.de/
portal/de/K11.html, last access 02/08/2018).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for County Level Estimation Sample
mean p25 p50 p75 sd
# Private patents 53.46 12.67 31.74 75.12 60.30
# Firm patents 46.99 10.85 27.60 65.91 52.21
# Public patents 2.11 0.00 0.50 1.79 4.95
# University patents 0.88 0.00 0.17 0.83 2.04
# Institute patents 1.24 0.00 0.17 0.83 3.54
Population in 1,000 175.13 99.59 137.96 219.00 128.30
Population density 474.43 112.00 189.00 562.30 606.06
Physicians per 100,000 capita 157.48 123.60 136.45 175.10 54.39
Students per 1,000 capita 27.48 0.00 0.90 35.05 50.09
Property tax multiplier 353.40 313.78 342.91 390.00 69.03
Business tax multiplier 361.92 329.38 349.65 397.12 49.31
Share SPD 0.24 0.15 0.23 0.32 0.12
Share Union 0.35 0.29 0.36 0.42 0.11
Share Greens 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.04
Share Liberals 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.03
Close to Luxembourg 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43
Close to Belgium or the Netherlands 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.47
Observations 3,208
Notes: Table reports descriptive statistics for our county level estimation sample. Property tax and business tax
multiplier as well as the seat shares of the political parties are municipality-population weighted. Source: Authors'
calculation based on Statistik Lokal, INKAR and OECD RegPAT database, 2003-2010.
In comparison, there are only 2.1 public patents on average, 1.24 are ﬁled by research
institutes and 0.88 ﬁled by universities. The average county has 175,000 inhabitants.
To assess some ﬁrst evidence for our research question, we illustrate the distribution
of ﬁrm and public patents within Germany (see Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively).
Counties with a darker color have more ﬁrm or public patent applications. There is
some evidence that more public patents are linked to more ﬁrm patents. To inspect the
relationship further, Figure 6 plots the average number of ﬁrm (white dots, left scale)
and public patent applications (black square, right scale) for deciles of public patent
applications. There is again evidence that counties with more public patent applications
also have more ﬁrm patent applications. Interestingly, the pattern of public to private
patents (which depends of course on the scales) is diﬀerent in the 10th deciles. This could
suggest a non-monotone relationship, for which we, however, account in our estimations.
Finally, Figure 7 plots the number of ﬁrm patents in counties with and without public
patents for population deciles. We do so to inspect whether the potential relationship is
driven by diﬀerences in the size of counties. The ﬁgure does not suggest so, as for all
population deciles the number of ﬁrm patents is larger in counties with public patents
compared to counties with no public patents.
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Figure 4: Number of Firm Patents 2003
Notes: Figure shows the number of ﬁrm patent applications
per county in 2003. All counties are included. In the ﬁnal
estimation sample, city states and counties with ﬁrm patent
applications in the top 1% of the distribution are excluded.
Source: Authors' calculations based on OECD RegPat
database, 2003.
Figure 5: Number of Public Patents 2003
Notes: Figure shows the number of public patent
applications per county in 2003. All counties are included.
In the ﬁnal estimation sample, city states and counties with
ﬁrm patent applications in the top 1% of the distribution
are excluded. Source: Authors' calculations based on
OECD RegPat database, 2003.
4 Empirical Results
Estimation Results without County Fixed Eﬀects: We now present our regression
results for the impact of the number of public patent applications on the number of ﬁrm
patent applications.27 We start with the results of the linear and the Poisson model
without county-ﬁxed eﬀects (see Table 3). Col. (1) to (4) show the results of the linear
model and col. (5) and (6) of the Poisson model. Col. (1) presents the OLS estimates.
The point estimates for the linear as well as the squared number of public patents are
statistical signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Thus, this suggests a non-linear relationship. In col.
(2) to (4) we employ the IV strategy. In col. (2) we only use the 4-year lagged institutional
funding for Fraunhofer and Leibniz institutes and in col. (3) in addition the 4-year lagged
institutional funding for central service staﬀ of universities as excluded instrument. The
test-statistics (reported in the bottom of the Table) conﬁrm again the relevance of our
excluded instruments. Further, the test of over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected
27We report the point estimates for our control variables only for our main speciﬁcations in Table
A.2 in the Appendix. They are largely in line with our expectations with two exceptions. First, the
point estimate of the local business tax turns positive once we include county-ﬁxed eﬀects which suggests
endogeneity problems due to reverse causality. Second, the eﬀect of health care provision is negative
without including ﬁxed eﬀects which could suggest an omitted variable bias. This does, however, not
aﬀect the point estimates for our variable of interest as we rely on the IV strategy. One eﬀect that is of
interest relates to the impact of patent box introductions in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
The interaction eﬀects between the indicator variable that is one if a county is close to these counties
and the reform dummies are negative in all speciﬁcations and for counties close to Luxembourg also
statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level in all speciﬁcations. Thus, the result suggests that patent
boxes are a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. The stronger eﬀect for Luxembourg could relate to the fact that
German is an oﬃcial language in Luxembourg.
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Figure 6: Number Firm Patents for Public
Patent Deciles
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Notes: Figure shows the number of public patent
applications for public patent deciles. All counties are
included. In the ﬁnal estimation sample, city states and
counties with ﬁrm patent applications in the 1% of the
distribution are excluded. Source: Authors' calculation
based on OECD RegPat database, 2003-2010.
Figure 7: Number Firm Patents for Popula-
tion Deciles
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Notes: Figure shows the number of public patent
applications for population deciles. All counties are
included. In the ﬁnal estimation sample, city states and
counties with ﬁrm patent applications in the 1% of the
distribution are excluded. Source: Authors' calculation
based on OECD RegPat database, 2003-2010.
when using both instruments, which lends support to the exogeneity of our instruments.
The estimated coeﬃcients are thus not surprisingly very similar in col. (2) and (3). We
include state-trends, linear and squared, in col. (4), which leaves the point estimates again
basically unchanged. Col. (5) presents the results of the baseline Poisson speciﬁcation. In
this speciﬁcation only the point estimate for the linear term is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, but also much smaller than in the log-linear model. Additional unreported regression
results suggest that the diﬀerent point estimates of the Poisson and log-linear model are
due to overdispersion. In col. (6) we address the potential endogeneity of public R&D
using a control function approach. Similar to the results for the log-linear model, the
point estimates change little. This suggests that there is either no endogeneity of public
patents or that our excluded instruments are not able to address the endogeneity due to
highly persistent public and private R&D activities. Thus, before interpreting our results,
we address the persistence in public and private R&D activities by including county-ﬁxed
eﬀects in our estimations.
Estimation Results with County Fixed Eﬀects: The results for the same spe-
ciﬁcations but now with county-ﬁxed eﬀects are reported in Table 4. The OLS point
estimates, shown in col. (1), are substantially lower and only marginally signiﬁcant.
When using solely lagged institutional funding for research institutes (col. (2)), both
point estimates increase substantially and are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Results are
again largely unaﬀected when additionally using institutional funding for universities as
excluded instrument (col. (3)) or when accounting for state-trends (col. (4)). Further,
the test of overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected, suggesting again the validity of
our excluded instruments. However, this test should be interpreted with caution as the
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Table 3: Main Results for County Level Estimations without County Fixed Eﬀects
Model OLS Poisson
Dep. Var. log(#patents) #patents
IV implemented as 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS CF
Excluded instrument:
L4.(ln) Institutional funding for
research institutes x x x x
universities x x x
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# Public patents 0.072*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.027*** 0.025
(0.008) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.006) (0.023)
# Public patents, sqrd. -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 3,188 3,188 3,188 3,188 3,208 3,208
Control variables x x x x x x
State-trends x
P-value Underidend. 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-Stat. Weak ident. 43 15 16
Shea R2: I 0.088 0.106 0.106
Shea R2: II 0.099 0.108 0.109
P-value Overidend. 0.696 0.657
Notes: Table shows estimated coeﬃcients for the impact of the number of public patent applications on the number
of ﬁrm patent applications without county-ﬁxed eﬀects. Col. (1) to (4) show the point estimates of the linear model,
which uses (ln) number of ﬁrm patent applications as dependent variable, and col. (5) and (6) the point estimates
of the Poisson model, which uses the number of ﬁrm patent applications as dependent variable. In col. (2) to (4)
and (6) we address the potential endogeneity of public patent applications using an IV approach. The excluded
instruments in col. (2) are the 4-year lagged (ln) institutional funding for Fraunhofer and Leibniz institutes linear
and squared. Col. (3), (4) and (6) employ the 4-year lagged (ln) institutional funding for Fraunhofer and Leibniz
institutes, linear and squared, and the 4-year lagged (ln) institutional funding for central services staﬀ of universities,
linear and squared, as excluded instruments. The IV strategy is implemented as 2SLS in col. (2) to (4) and via a
control function approach in col. (6). Robust (col. (1) to (5)) and block-bootstrapped (col. (6)) standard errors
in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Author's calculation based on
Statistik Lokal, INKAR and OECD RegPAT database, 2003-2010.
second instrument is not longer statistically signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage (see col. (4) in
Table A.1), which is also indicated by the F-Statistic, which is below 10, and the p-value
for the test of underidentiﬁcation, which exceeds 5%. The point estimates of the baseline
Poisson model are as for the linear model close to zero (col. (5)). When using the IV
strategy the point estimates increase and are of similar size as for the log-linear model
(col. (6)), although less precisely estimated. Overall, the IV results with county-ﬁxed
eﬀects using the linear and the Poisson model are very similar to the results of the linear
model without county-ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, the similar magnitude of IV and non-IV esti-
mates in the estimations without county-ﬁxed eﬀects point indeed to the fact that omitted
variables and reverse causality are of minor importance. This suggests that public R&D
is used by governments in a forward looking way. The downward bias in the speciﬁcations
with county-ﬁxed eﬀects is thus due to dynamic mis-speciﬁcation or measurement error
(which is more severe in ﬁxed eﬀect estimations).
Sensitivity Analysis: Table A.3 presents robustness tests with respect to the depen-
dent variable, the explanatory variable of interest as well as the control variables using
our preferred speciﬁcation, shown in col. (2) in Table 4. We prefer using only lagged
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Table 4: Main Results for County Level Estimations with County Fixed Eﬀects
Model OLS Poisson
Dep. Var. log(#patents) #patents
IV implemented as 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS CF
Excluded instrument:
L4.(ln) Institutional funding for
research institutes x x x x
universities x x x
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# Public patents 0.007 0.096** 0.111** 0.075** 0.003 0.089
(0.004) (0.045) (0.045) (0.034) (0.003) (0.079)
# Public patents, sqrd. -0.000* -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.000 -0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Observations 3,188 3,188 3,188 3,188 3,208 3,208
County-FE x x x x x x
Control variables x x x x x x
State-trends x
P-value Underidend. 0.035 0.134 0.156
F-Stat. Weak ident. 18 9 13
Shea R2: I 0.011 0.011 0.014
Shea R2: II 0.015 0.016 0.018
P-value Overidend. 0.351 0.296
Notes: Table shows estimated coeﬃcients for the impact of the number of public patent applications on the
number of ﬁrm patent applications with county-ﬁxed eﬀects. Col. (1) to (4) show the point estimates of the
linear model, which uses (ln) number of ﬁrm patent applications as dependent variable, and col. (5) and (6) the
point estimates of the Poisson model, which uses the number of ﬁrm patent applications as dependent variable.
In col. (2) to (4) and (6) we address the potential endogeneity of public patent applications using an IV
approach. The excluded instrument in col. (2) is the 4-year lagged (ln) institutional funding for Fraunhofer and
Leibniz institutes, linear and squared. Col. (3), (4) and (6) employ the 4-year lagged (ln) institutional funding
for Fraunhofer and Leibniz institutes, linear and squared, and the 4-year lagged (ln) institutional funding for
central services staﬀ of universities, linear and squared, as excluded instruments. The IV strategy is implemented
as 2SLS in col. (2) to (4) and via a control function approach in col. (6). Robust (col. (1) to (5)) and block-
bootstrapped (col. (6)) standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Author's calculation based on INKAR and RegPAT 2003-2010.
institutional funding for Fraunhofer and Leibniz institutes as the excluded instrument,
as it avoids the weak instrument problem. Further, the linear model seems to be more
robust. In a ﬁrst robustness test, we assess the role of weighting the number of patents by
the number of applicants and the number of investors. We obtain very similar estimates
when weighting only by the number of inventors (see col. (1) in Table A.3). This is not
surprising given that most patents are ﬁled by only one applicant. In col. (2) we exclude
ﬁrm patent applications that are ﬁled jointly with a research institute or an university to
assess whether public-private collaborations are driving the results. We do not ﬁnd evi-
dence for that. In col. (3) we use (ln) number of ﬁrm R&D employees on the county level
as the dependent variable to address the concern that not all inventions are patentable.
The number of ﬁrm R&D employees is only available for 2003, 2005, and 2007 and 2009,
but based on a full-assessment of ﬁrms' R&D activities in Germany. The point estimates
increase by roughly 50% which is in line with the fact that not all inventions are paten-
table. In col. (4) we exclude medical patents ﬁled by universities which often operate
hospitals. Results are unchanged. Col. (5) and (6) show the results of two robustness
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tests with respect to the inclusion of control variables. In col. (5) we additionally include
(ln) local gross domestic product as well as (ln) local gross-value added and in col. (6)
we include (ln) number of ﬁrm patents ﬁled between 1991 and 2000 interacted with year
dummies to account for a potential agglomeration eﬀect that could drive the results. In
both speciﬁcations, the point estimates are very similar.
As a last robustness check, we investigate the impact of patent quality. We do so by
constructing a quality weighted number of ﬁrm patent applications following the procedure
outlined in Ernst et al. (2014).28 Since we have the relevant data only for the EPO patent
applications, we only use the subsample of EPO ﬁrm patent applications and exclude ﬁrm
patent applications that were ﬁled under the PCT. The regression results are shown in
Table A.4 in the Appendix. We start assessing the impact of focusing solely on EPO ﬁrm
patents (col. (1)). The point estimate for the linear number of public patents is with
0.076 smaller, but conﬁdence intervals overlap with the point estimate in our preferred
speciﬁcation. In col. (2) we adjust the number of ﬁrm patent applications using the
absolute quality indicator and in col. (3) using the relative quality indicator. Finally, we
simply weight ﬁrm patent applications by the patent's family size (col. (4)). All point
estimates are very similar which suggests no impact of patent quality heterogeneity on
our IV estimates.
Eﬀect Size: Given the robustness of our IV results, we now discuss the size of the im-
pact of public on private R&D. Due to the non-linear and potentially even non-monotone
relationship, we illustrate the eﬀect of a marginal increase in public patents graphically
based on the results of our preferred speciﬁcation shown in col. (2) in Table 4. Our
estimated semi-elasticity for a level of public patents from 0 to 26 is shown in Figure
8. The semi-elasticity is decreasing with the number of patents and turns negative at a
level of around 21 public patents. For the median county with non-zero public patents
we estimate a semi-elasticity of 0.09.29 For the median county for which our instrument
for research institutes is non-zero, we estimate a semi-elasticity of 0.07 which translates
into an elasticity of 0.39.
In absolute terms, our results suggest that in the median county with non-zero public
patents an increase in the number of public patents by one would generate 3.5 new ﬁrm
patent applications (median patent applications is 38).30 While the absolute number is
interesting, even more important are the public costs to generate these additional patents.
28The quality of a patent is based on three factors: a patent's forward citations, its family size, and
its number of technical ﬁelds. The number of forward citations a patent receives within ﬁve years after
the publication date signals if the patent has induced further innovations. The patent's family size which
is the number of countries in which the ﬁrm ﬁles a patent application is an indicator for the patent's
anticipated earnings potential. Lastly, the number of technical ﬁelds the patent is ﬁled in presents a
proxy for its technological quality (Lerner, 1994).
29We focus on the median as the distribution of patent applications is skewed.
30In the median county with non-zero lagged institutional funding for research institutes, 2.8 new ﬁrm
patent applications are generated.
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Figure 8: Semi-Elasticity and Elasticity of Firm Patents to Public Patents
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the estimated semi-elasticity of the number of ﬁrm patent applications with respect to public
patent applications as well as the implied elasticity. Semi-elasticity and elasticity are based on the speciﬁcation shown in
col. (2) in Table 4.
Although our ﬁrst stage provides a relationship between institutional funding and the
number of public patents, this relationship is likely to be misleading. The reason is that we
use all public patents, but only institutional funding for Fraunhofer and Leibniz institutes
as excluded instrument due to a lack of data. Further, patents are not produced in all
science ﬁelds. Given these diﬃculties, we believe it is informative to think about a lower
and an upper bound of the costs per patent. An upper bound is given by the simple average
of R&D expenditures of the research institutes per patent, (excluding own income and
expenditures for research in humanities) which is 5.3 million EURO (see Table 1). This
would give us institutional costs per ﬁrm patent of 1.5 million EURO for the median county
with non-zero public patents. A lower bound can be characterized by simply focusing on
Fraunhofer institutes, which are mainly active in technology and application-oriented
research. Using a ﬁxed eﬀect Poisson model with the number of Fraunhofer institutes'
patent applications as dependent variable and the institutional funding for Fraunhofer
institutes as explanatory variable (results are available upon request) we calculate the
institutional costs per Fraunhofer EPO (or PCT) application to be around 2.7 million
EURO, which is close to the simple average of expenditures per patent for the Fraunhofer
institutes.31 Thus, a lower bound of the institutional costs per patents in the median
county with non-zero public patents is given by 0.8 million EURO. As a robustness check,
we can also use the estimated costs per EPO patent for a UK ﬁrm of 4.6 million EURO (3.7
31We estimate a semi-elasticity of 0.06. The mean number of Fraunhofer patent applications is 4.4.
Thus, institutional funding has to increase by around 3.8 million EURO such that the number of patent
applications increases by 23% which is one additional patent. However, this has to be scaled down, as we
only consider institutional funding for institutes that existed between 1999 and 2007. These institutes
account for roughly 70% of the overall expenditures.
22
million GBP) as reported in Dechezlepretre et al. (2016). This would suggest institutional
costs per patent of 1.2 million EURO, which is within our estimated range. Since our
costs per ﬁrm patent application assumes a similar impact of research institute' patents as
for university' patents, we investigate this also empirically and did not ﬁnd any evidence
against this assumption (results are available upon request). Thus, we conclude that the
institutional costs per ﬁrm patent application are between 0.8 and 1.5 million EURO.
To put these costs into perspective, we compare them to the public costs per ﬁrm
patent application using another widely employed ﬁrm R&D support strategy, namely
R&D tax credits. Two recent papers, one for the US and for the UK, estimate a ratio
of value to money of 1.7 for R&D tax credits (see Rao (2016) and Dechezlepretre et al.
(2016)). This means that for each GBP (or US Dollar) given as tax credit, a ﬁrm spends
1.7 GBP (US Dollar) in (qualifying) R&D expenses. Further, Dechezlepretre et al. (2016)
quantify (qualifying) R&D expenses per ﬁrm patent to be around 1.5 million GBP for a
national patent and 3.7 million GBP for a EPO patent. This implies public costs for one
UK ﬁrm EPO patent application of 2.7 million EURO (using an exchange rate of 0.8).
Under the assumption that UK and German ﬁrms are similar, this means that the public
costs per ﬁrm patent application using R&D tax credits are roughly twice as large as the
public costs using public R&D. In other words, it is less expensive to stimulate ﬁrm R&D
by creating knowledge outside the ﬁrm than by providing ﬁnancial incentives to the ﬁrm.
Intensive vs Extensive Margin: In the ﬁnal part of the empirical analysis, we
aim to investigate which ﬁrms are responding to an increase in public R&D. We start
investigating the relevance of intensive and extensive margin. The results are reported
in Table 5. In col. (1) and (2) we use the number of patenting ﬁrms, and in col. (3)
and (4) the number of patents per ﬁrm, both on the county level. Col. (1) and (3)
report the results of the log-linear model and col. (2) and (4) of the Poisson model. In
all speciﬁcations, we include county-ﬁxed eﬀects and employ the IV strategy with lagged
institutional funding for research institutes as excluded instrument. The point estimates
of the linear and the Poisson model are very similar for each of the dependent variables,
although as before less precisely estimated using the Poisson model. Since the point
estimates are substantially larger and only signiﬁcant for the number of patenting ﬁrms,
our results suggests that the extensive margin is the more important adjustment margin.
This contrasts with empirical evidence on the impact of R&D tax credits on ﬁrm patenting
behavior, for which usually the intensive margin is the more important adjustment margin
(e.g. Dechezlepretre et al. (2016)).
Next, we assess whether the extensive margin is driven by previously non-patenting
ﬁrms or occasionally patenting ﬁrms. We do so by estimating the relationship of interest
at the applicant-county level including applicant-county-ﬁxed eﬀects. The results are
shown in Table 6. Col. (1) shows the results of the baseline and col. (2) of the IV Poisson
model speciﬁcation. The point estimates are literally zero in col. (1) and again larger
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Table 5: Estimation Results for Intensive and Extensive Margin Response
Model OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
Dep. Var. ln(.) ln(.)
# patenting ﬁrm # patent intensity
IV implemented as 2SLS CF 2SLS CF
Excluded instrument:
L4.(ln) Institutional funding for
research institutes x x x x
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Public patents 0.081** 0.075 0.015 0.018
(0.035) (0.055) (0.021) (0.060)
# Public patents, sqrd. -0.002** -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Observations 3,188 3,208 3,188 3,208
County-FE x x x x
Control variables x x x x
P-value Underidend. 0.027 0.027
F-Stat. Weak ident. 13 13
Shea R2: I 0.010 0.010
Shea R2: II 0.013 0.013
Notes: Table shows estimated coeﬃcient for the impact of public patent applications
on the number of patenting ﬁrms (col. (1) and (2)) and the patent intensity of ﬁrms
(col. (3) and (4)). In col. (1) and (3) we use a log-linear model and in col. (2) and (4)
a Poisson model. All regressions include county-ﬁxed eﬀects and are IV estimations
using 4-year lagged (ln) institutional funding for Fraunhofer and Leibniz institutes,
linear and squared, as excluded instruments. Robust standard errors (col. (1) and col.
(3)) or bootstrapped standard errors (col. (2) and (4)) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance
levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Author's calculation based on
Statistik Loklal, INKAR and OECD RegPAT database 2003-2010.
in col. (2) and at least marginally signiﬁcant. In col. (3) and (4) we split the sample
into applicant-regions with and without patent applications ﬁled between 1999 and 2002.
The results show that pre-dominantly ﬁrms that have ﬁled patents in a region between
1999 and 2002 respond to the number of public patent applications in that region. Thus,
it is not previously non-patenting ﬁrms that respond, but occasionally patenting ﬁrms.
A side beneﬁt of this insight is that it rules out that the eﬀect on ﬁrm R&D is driven
by spin-oﬀs from university or research institute R&D. In col. (5) we assess the extent
of within-ﬁrm spillovers as potential negative non-local spillovers that could lead to an
overestimation of the local knowledge spillovers. To do so, we include additional variables
that measure the number of public patents, linear and squared, in all other regions in
which the applicant has ﬁled patents between 1999 and 2002 and instrument them using
the lagged institutional funding in these regions. The results suggest negative spillovers
and thus provide evidence for some relocation of activity in response to more public R&D
in one location. Reassuring is that there is again evidence for a non-monotone relationship,
as the negative eﬀect is weaker the more public patents increase in other regions. Finally,
we aim to shed some more light on the transmission channel. If personal interactions or
workforce mobility are driving the results, we expect a stronger eﬀect for ﬁrms that have
closer links to the public R&D producers. Our results conﬁrm this presumption. When
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splitting the sample into applicant-regions without jointly ﬁled (col. (6)) and with jointly
ﬁled patent applications with a university or research institute between 1999 and 2002
(col. (7)), we ﬁnd a very strong impact for the second group but an insigniﬁcant and
substantially smaller estimates for the ﬁrst group. Thus, while jointly ﬁled applications
are not driving the results, ﬁrms that have close links to institutes and universities beneﬁt
the most from public R&D.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we assess the impact of public R&D by universities and research institutes
on ﬁrm R&D in Germany. We proxy R&D activities using patent applications from
the OECD RegPat database and address the potential endogeneity of public R&D by
employing an instrumental variable strategy using lagged institutional funding for research
institutes and central service staﬀ of universities as excluded instruments. We ﬁnd that an
increase in the number of public patent applications by one increases the number of ﬁrm
patent applications by 3.5 patent applications in the median county with non-zero public
patent applications but also that the eﬀects turns negative for high levels of public patent
applications (above 21). We estimate that the costs of an additional public patent are
between 2.7 and 5.3 million EURO, which suggests public costs per ﬁrm patent application
between 0.8 and 1.5 million EURO. Further, we ﬁnd that the overall eﬀect is driven by an
increase in the number of patenting ﬁrms in a region and that ﬁrms that have collaborated
with institutes and universities in a region in the past beneﬁt most from public R&D.
At least three conclusions can be drawn from our work. First, the German ﬁrm
R&D support strategy, which relies dominantly on public R&D carried out by research
institutes is a successful one. If German ﬁrms are similar to, for example, US or UK ﬁrms,
our result suggests that public R&D leads to more ﬁrm patent applications at the same
public costs than using R&D tax credits to stimulate ﬁrm R&D. Second, since public
R&D seems to impact ﬁrms' R&D activities along the extensive margin, our ﬁndings
suggest that an optimal R&D support strategy is likely to consists of public R&D as well
as direct subsidies. Although the latter are less cost-eﬃcient, they impact ﬁrm R&D along
the intensive margin. Finally, our results highlight the potential crowding out eﬀect of
private R&D and identify a level of public R&D for which the eﬀect turns negative.
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A Additional Regression Results
Table A.1: Results for the Impact of Institutional Funding on the Number of Public
Patent Applications and First Stage Results
Model OLS
Dep. Var. (# public patents)
First Stage First Stage
Tab 3, col. (6) Tab 4, col. (6))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L4.ln(Institutional funding institutes) 0.314*** -4.461*** 2.416*** -29.364**
(0.030) (0.704) (0.527) (13.119)
L4.ln(Institutional funding institutes), sqrd. 0.297*** 1.090**
(0.045) (0.450)
L4.ln(Institutional funding universities) 0.069*** -1.218*** 0.096 3.324
(0.014) (0.178) (0.467) (6.516)
L4.ln(Institutional funding universities), sqrd. 0.082*** -0.106
(0.011) (0.209)
R2 0.447 0.546 0.155 0.169
Observations 3,208 3,208 3,208 3,208
Control Variables x x x x
County-FE x x
Notes: Table shows estimated coeﬃcients for the impact of 4-year lagged (ln) institutional funding of research institutes
and 4-year lagged (ln) institutional funding of central service staﬀ of universities on the number of public patents. All
regressions are OLS estimates. Col. (1) and (2) show the results without county-ﬁxed eﬀects and col. (3) and (4) the
results with county-ﬁxed eﬀects. Col. (2) and (4) show the ﬁrst stage results for the linear number of public patents as
used in col. (6) in Table 3 and col. (6) in Table 4. In col. (1) and (3) we only include linear institutional funding to
illustrate the positive impact of institutional funding on the number of public patent applications. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Author's calculation based on Statistik
Lokal, INKAR and OECD RegPAT database, 2003-2010.
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Table A.2: Results for Control Variables
Model OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
Dep. Var. ln(# ﬁrm patents) # ﬁrm patents ln(# ﬁrm patents) # ﬁrm patents
Tab. 3 Tab. 4
col. (3) col. (6) col. (3) col. (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Close to LUX. 0.157** -0.008
(0.064) (0.124)
Close to BEL or NLD -0.316*** -0.150
(0.071) (0.109)
Close to Lux * D(>2006) -0.144** -0.106*** -0.096*** -0.061*
(0.072) (0.041) (0.033) (0.034)
Close to Lux * D(>2007) -0.065 -0.023 -0.050 -0.032
(0.066) (0.041) (0.031) (0.042)
Population 0.009*** 0.006*** -0.010 -0.006
(0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.011)
Population, sqrd. -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population density 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003 -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Population density, sqrd. -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Property tax multiplier -0.001*** -0.002** -0.001* 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business tax multiplier -0.003*** -0.001 0.003** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Physicians per 100.000 capita -0.005*** -0.003** 0.005*** 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Students per 1.000 capita -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share SPD -0.580*** -0.993** 0.383 0.183
(0.195) (0.393) (0.395) (0.374)
Share Union 0.477*** -0.246 -0.298 -0.257
(0.165) (0.371) (0.238) (0.284)
Share Greens 3.057*** 1.069 -2.914*** -2.095
(0.516) (1.457) (0.871) (1.320)
Share Liberals 1.399** 3.102** 1.249* 0.297
(0.711) (1.335) (0.744) (0.697)
Observations 3,188 3,208 3,188 3,208
State-FE x x
Year-FE x x x x
County-FE x x
Notes: Table shows estimated coeﬃcients for the control variables in col. (3) and (6) of Table 3 and Table Table 4. Robust
(col. (1) and (3)) and block-bootstrapped (col. (2) and (4)) standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Author's calculation based on Statistik Lokal, INKAR and OECD RegPAT database,
2003-2010.
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Table A.3: Sensitivity Analysis for County Level Estimations
Model IV
Dep. Var. ln(# patents) ln(.) ln(# patents)
Inventor w/o joint R&D
weighted ventures employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# Public patents 0.096** 0.093** 0.155** 0.096** 0.083**
(0.044) (0.045) (0.075) (0.046) (0.040)
# Public patents, sqrd. -0.002** -0.002** -0.003** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
# Public patents, 0.097**
w/o medical patents (0.046)
# Public patents, sqrd. -0.002**
w/o medical patents (0.001)
Observations 3,188 3,188 1,556 3,188 3,114 3,188
Control Variables x x x x x x
County-FE x x x x x x
GDP and GVA x
# Patents 91-00-Year-FE x
P-value Underidend. 0.024 0.027 0.122 0.030 0.030 0.025
F-Stat. Weak Ident. 15 18 31 14 19 21
Shea R2: I 0.011 0.011 0.021 0.011 0.011 0.012
Shea R2: II 0.014 0.015 0.029 0.013 0.015 0.016
Notes: Table shows estimated coeﬃcients for the sensitivity analysis of the impact of the number of public patent
applications on the number of ﬁrm patent applications with county-ﬁxed eﬀects. In all columns IV estimations are
shown using 4-year lagged (ln) institutional spending for Fraunhofer and Leibniz institutes, linear and squared, as
excluded instruments. In col. (1) we only use inventor and not applicant weighted number of patent applications.
In col. (2) we exclude ﬁrm patent applications that are ﬁled jointly with a university or a research institute. In
col. (3) we use (ln) ﬁrm R&D employees on the county level as dependent variable. In col. (4) we exclude medical
patents ﬁled by universities from the number of public patent applications. In col. (5) we control in addition for (ln)
local gross-domestic product and (ln) local gross-value added. In col. (6) we additionally control for (ln) number
of ﬁrm patents ﬁled between 1991 and 2000 interacted with year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Author's calculation based on Statistik Lokal,
INKAR and OECD RegPAT database, 2003-2010.
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Table A.4: Sensitivity Analysis with Respect to Patent Quality
Model IV
Dep. Var. log(# EPO patents)
absolute relative family size
quality quality weighted
weighted weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Public patents 0.076* 0.076* 0.071* 0.071*
(0.039) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040)
# Public patents, sqrd. -0.001* -0.002* -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 3,182 3,182 3,182 3,182
Control Variables x x x x
County-FE x x x x
P-value Underidend. 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
F-Stat. Weak Ident. 11 11 11 11
Shea R2: I 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
Shea R2: II 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043
Notes: Table shows estimated coeﬃcients for the sensitivity analysis with respect
to ﬁrm patent application quality. In all columns IV estimations are shown using
4-year lagged (ln) institutional spending for Fraunhofer and Leibniz institutes, linear
and squared, separately as excluded instrument. We use them separately here as the
instrument quality is better in this case (and thus standard errors are lower). We
construct a quality adjusted number of patent applications following the procedure
outlined in Ernst et al. (2014). Due to data availability we can only implement
the quality adjustment for the EPO sample. Thus, col. (1) shows our baseline
speciﬁcation using only EPO patents. In col. (2) we use the absolute quality indicator
weighted number of ﬁrm patent applications. In col. (3) we use the relative quality
indicator weighted number of ﬁrm patent applications and and in col. (4) we use
a family size weighted number of ﬁrm patent applications. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source:
Author's calculation based on Statistik Lokal, INKAR and OECD RegPAT database,
2003-2010.
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